Introduction
One proposed function for secondary sexual characters is that of enhancing breeding success by attracting potential mates. Mate choice is a widespread feature of mating systems. The benefits of choosiness may be direct (e.g. high-quality partners are better in rearing common offspring) or indirect (high-quality partners transmit 'better' genes, in terms of viability or attractiveness, to the common offspring) ( There is strong empirical justification in sticklebacks (see below) that both signaling and paternal investment depend largely on environmental conditions and own state, which itself varies with environmental hazards such as parasitisation (e.g. MILINSKI & BAKKER, 1990 ). An important question is whether the observed plasticity is adaptive. One way to investigate this question is to derive optimal reaction norms for paternal investment and signaling, then to compare results with empirical data. The purpose of the present model is precisely to derive such specific predictions, to compare expected patterns with published work on stickleback behaviour, and to suggest further experimental tests on relevant points.
Assumptions.
The primary function of paternal investment (Ip) is to increase offspring survival (po) . This has been empirically demonstrated in a number of fish with paternal care, including sticklebacks (VAN DEN ASSEM, 1967), fathead minnows (SARGENT, 1988 ) and rock bass (SABAT, 1994) . So let us assume a positive relationship between these two variables (Fig. la) . A convex shape seems realistic; a unit increase in fanning activity should have the strongest effect when average fanning level is low.
Paternal investment also has costs, both in terms of risk and energy spent, which potentially decrease the father's survival (pa) (Fig. la) . A convex shape again seems realistic; when fanning activity is already high, any increase must be taken over the time necessary for feeding and the energy necessary for maintenance. These assumptions of convexity ensure that the optimal solution is not boundary, which would result in either absence of paternal investment, or maximal investment followed by death. A mathematical formulation of these assumptions is provided in Appendix A, together with a numerical example.
A third assumption concerns egg number. The more clutches in a nest, the more oxygen is needed to ensure a given level of offspring survival. In other words, for a fixed level of fanning activity, hatching success (p0) should decrease as the number of eggs in the nest (Nm) increases. VAN IERSEL (1953) and ROHWER (1978) similarly assumed that oxygen supply might limit the male's brood size. This relationship is illustrated in Fig lb, where convexity is assumed again for simple physical reasons: the eggs that require fanning are not those at the periphery of a clutch (who benefit from direct access to oxygen-rich water) but those situated deep in the clutch, where oxygen is quickly depleted. Due to surface-volume relationships, the proportion of eggs that require fanning increases with clutch size, so that the amount of fanning necessary to maintain a given level of hatching success increases more than proportionally. These two opposing effects of paternal investment (Ip) and egg number (Nm) on offspring survival can be plotted on a single graph in the Ip-Nm plane, where po is represented by isoclines of increasing value as Ip increases and as Nm decreases (Fig. 2a) . The slope of isoclines is derived in Appendix B, and illustrated by a numerical example.
Fitness.
At any age, the optimal allocation decision is that which maximizes current reproductive value vt. This can be written:
where Nm is fecundity for the current breeding cycle (total number of eggs in a male's nest), po is hatching success, Pa is adult survival until the next breeding cycle, and vt+l its reproductive value at the start of next 
From comparison of equations (1) and (2), the differences in the objectives of the two sexes are straightforward. As opposed to females, males do not necessarily want to maximise current hatching success, and this creates a potential for conflict.
Strategies.
Female strategy, aimed at maximising hatching success, consists of visiting males and inspecting them for cues as to potential p0 (including male signal level -see below). Males lying on a high po-isocline (Fig. 2a) Male strategy is twofold. They may first adjust their level of paternal investment to local conditions. The optimal level depends on the way Ip affects the two components of reproductive value; that is, both current reproduction poNm and residual reproductive value pavt+,1 (Eqn. 1). These relationships are illustrated on Fig. 3a . Their shapes depend on external as well as internal conditions, which therefore affect the optimal value. The second aspect of male strategy concerns mating success: they may try to attract females by displaying their willingness to care for offspring, and thereby convince them to spawn. Let us now address these two strategies in turn.
Optimal paternal investment.
The problem is represented graphically in is determined by the point where the slopes of the two curves have the same absolute value.
Egg number.
As shown in Fig. 3b , an increase in Nm results in a steeper slope of the poNm curve) so that the optimal paternal investment value shifts to the right. This is understandable intuitively; if for some reason a male succeeds in getting many clutches, a slight increase in paternal investment will make a lot of increase in present reproductive success, but only at slight cost in residual reproductive value. This prediction has empirical 
Male condition.
A result more relevant to the present study (because we are interested in female choice for paternal investment) concerns the way Ip* may change with male condition or quality (Q). Quality is defined here by its positive effect on survival under bad conditions. On this definition, low-quality males suffer more when increasing paternal investment. A mathematical formulation of this is provided in Appendix D, and illustrated in Fig. 3d . As can be seen, residual reproductive value decreases more rapidly with paternal investment in low-quality males. Since the slope of pavt+l is steeper at any Ip value, the equilibrium condition shifts to the left. As a result, the optimal paternal investment (for a given egg number) correlates with quality. A numerical example is developed in Appendix D, and illustrated in the Ip-Nm plane (Fig. 2c) 
Dynamics of clutch laying
The dynamics of clutch laying of females in a population can be illustrated in the Jp-Nm plane (Fig. 2d) . Let us assume for the moment that females can detect both male quality and egg number (by inspecting male display and visiting nest -see below), and therefrom infer Ip and p0. The highest-quality male should be chosen by the first females, since he provides the highest marginal increase in p0. As a result, the associated po will first increase up to a maximal value, then decline. Further females should however keep on choosing this male, as long as he provides the highest available po value; that is, until this value has declined down to the level offered by other males (dashed p.-isocline in Fig. 2d ). At this point, females should switch to the 2nd-highest male. The associated po value will thus first increase, then decline back to the common value. This process will continue until all males have received eggs, and lie along the common p0-isocline (dashed in Fig. 2d ). At this point, all nests provide the same return to females, so that additional clutches will be distributed among all males, but in such a way that their hatching success decrease at the same rate. When the process stops, all males lie on the same poisocline, but of course their Nm differ, and correlate with quality. The equilibrium relationship between egg number and male quality is derived in Appendix E (together with a numerical example), and illustrated in Fig.  4a . The important point is that, if females can assess male quality, then at equilibrium high-quality males have more eggs in their nests. This dynamics and equilibrium result from the same logic that underlies the 'polygyny-threshold model' (e.g. VERNER & WILLSON, 1966; ORIANS, 1969), according to which female breeding birds may accept polygyny when its disadvantages (shared help from the male) are overcompensated by strong differences in male and/or territory quality. Although originally developed for birds, this concept readily applies to fish. The only difference here is that, as a consequence of our assumptions, polygyny is actually beneficial to females over the lower part of the egg-number range (i.e. up to the maximum in po, open circle in Fig. 2b It follows from the same logic that, at equilibrium, female clutches are ideally-free distributed with respect to hatching success. This conclusion of course relies on the same assumptions that underlie the ideal-free distribution in foraging theory (e.g. FRETWELL & LuCAS, 1970; FRETWELL, 1972), namely that females are free to move from male to male, and can perfectly assess both male quality and egg number. Any cost to female search, as well as errors in the information-gathering process, would cause departures from this distribution. As a result, the correlation between egg number and male quality would decrease, and hatching success would show positive correlations with both egg-number and male quality.
Optimal signaling
Let's turn now to the second part of male strategy, that of attracting females. As pointed above, males differ in the level of paternal investment they are willing to pay, due to differences in either quality or residual reproductive value. A male which is ready to invest above average should signal it to females. The reason appears clearly from the last paragraph on the dynamics of clutch laying. For a fixed egg number, the higher the investment, the higher the resulting p., which is exactly what females are looking for. Females should thus prefer males ready to invest more, and this in turn further increases male fitness through enhanced mating success. Male advertisement is thus under pressure from sexual selection, or perhaps preferably, signal selection (ZAHAVI, 1981).
The theory of signal states that, whenever there is a conflict of interest between the sender and receiver of a message (as is the case here), the signal must be costly to be reliable (the so-called 'handicap' principle; ZAHAVI, 1975; GRAFEN, 1990). Otherwise, low-quality males would signal as much as high-quality ones, and thus get as many eggs. Females should not trust a signal which is not costly, because it is too easy to cheat for the male. By contrast, a costly signal can be reliable: costs prevent cheating, insofar as high-quality males can also afford the costs of a higher signal level. Its optimal level, S*, can be calculated as a function of the above variables (vt+l, Q Nm), while taking into account that males also adjust Ip* to these same variables. Derivations are given in Appendix F, together with a numerical example. Fig. 4b presents graphically changes in S* with quality and egg number. As can be seen, the optimal signal level first increases, then decreases with egg number. This arises because signaling expresses the marginal gain of additional eggs, which first increases, then decreases with egg number.
The egg number for which the signal vanishes corresponds to the point where fitness gains (in terms of increased offspring number) are overcompensated by fitness costs (in terms of decreased offspring and adult survival). At this point males do not signal anymore, and further eggs are refused. This maximal egg number is higher for good-quality males, as is in fact the overall signal value for any given Nm. This arises from the fact that high-quality males are ready to invest more for a given egg number, and therefore signal more.
A general consequence of such relationships between signaling, egg number and quality is that combined information on both Nm and S* allow females to gain precise ideas, both of the amount of paternal investment a male is ready to spend, and of the associated po. It is worth noting that S* alone would not suffice: males expressing a given signal value may be either low-quality ones with few eggs, or high-quality ones with many eggs (Fig. 4b) . Therefore, checking egg number in the nest usefully completes the information. Fig. 2b) , this explanation might be tested by checking the hatching success over an experimentally manipulated range of egg numbers.
The special dynamics of clutch laying expected from the present model (i.e. that nests are filled first successively, then simultaneously; Fig. 2d ) would also need further empirical investigations.
A second set of predictions concerns signaling, and also already has empirical support. One is that signal level first increases, then decreases with egg number (Fig. 4b) . It has indeed been observed that male coloration brightens JAMIESON Fig. 2d ), while experimental data should meet condition (C 1) (e.g. Ip* curves on Fig. 2b to d) .
Although hatching success (po) depends on both paternal investment and egg number, at equilibrium no such correlation should exist, because of the ideal free distribution of clutches. Thus, experimental data should reveal a negative effect of egg number and a positive effect of paternal investment on hatching success. Experimentally increasing egg number (clutch size manipulations), for instance, should lower hatching success. By contrast, observational data should show an equal hatching success for all males in a population. As pointed above, however, this prediction relies on the assumptions that females pay no costs when searching males, and make no errors when gathering information. Departure from these assumptions might result in a weak positive correlation between egg number and hatching success, such as observed in fathead minnows by SARGENT (pers. comm.) in non-manipulated conditions.
The precise value of this hatching success depends on how many clutches in total are to be spread among available males, and therefore on female fecundity and sex-ratio. With a low average number of clutches per nest, males will stay on a higher p.-isocline: hatching success will be high, contrasting with a low average level of paternal investment. Signaling, on the other hand, will be high. Empirical data suggest indeed that under conditions of female shortage and increased male-male exploitative competition, the average signal level increases (T.C.M. BAKKER & B.
MUNDWILER, unpublished data). It is worth noting however that such an increase might also arise from interactive competition, insofar as signals might also act to deter neighbours. Modelling interactive competition, however, would be a game problem in itself, and beyond the scope of the present model.
For very low female availability, the dynamics of clutch laying predicts that some males will remain without eggs. This implies a bimodal distribution of egg numbers, with two categories of males, some getting many eggs, and others none. This further increases the scope for sexual selection and the overal level of signaling.
An interesting alternative male strategy arises in such a case, namely egg kleptoparasitism. Indeed, low-ranking males are at risk of getting no eggs at all. If they can manage to get just a few, they will automatically move on a higher p.-isocline. This should suffice to make females lay here rather than in empty nests, even those of higher-quality males. To be precise, males should not care for stolen eggs; but the point is that visiting females ignore eggs' provenance, and are thus fooled when infering po. As a result, a small difference at the beginning may be enough to start a kind of runaway process, ending in a breeding success higher than expected from quality alone. This may explain the empirical observation of egg kleptoparasitism by males ( Note that p0 is here a constant, the actual value of which depends on the local situation (see 'dynamics of clutch laying'). Equation (El) expresses a positive relationship between quality and egg number, which is illustrated in Fig. 4a , where v,t+, po, b and c are fixed to some arbitrary values. As can be seen, the number of eggs in a nest at equilibrium increases with male quality, first rapidly, then more slowly.
